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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tyrell Lee Ramsey appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery
with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration with a foreign object, and
misdemeanor battery.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At a party Ramsey cornered L.N. in a bathroom, told her "this is going to
happen," groped her breast, and put his hand down her pants, all over her
protests and requests that he stop. (Trial Tr., p. 233, L. 12 - p. 240, L. 6. 1) L.N.
managed to escape out of the bathroom. (Trial Tr., p. 240, Ls. 7-16.) Later at
the same party Ramsey pulled S.P. from a back porch to the side of the house
where he pressed her against the wall of the house, told her she wanted to do
this when she told him she did not, pinned her to the ground, overcame her
physical resistance and pulled down her pants, grabbed her by the throat and
told her he would kill her, inserted a finger in her vagina, and tried to force his
erect penis into her vagina until she screamed for help. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 148, L.
18 - p. 153, L. 23.) When other people at the party came in response to the
scream, Ramsey fled. (Trial Tr., p. 300, L. 2 - p. 307, L. 6.)
The state charged Ramsey with one count of attempted forcible rape of
L.N., one count of attempted forcible rape of S.P, one count of battery with intent

·, The transcript herein referenced as 'Trial Tr." includes two pre-trial motion
hearings and all but day one of the jury trial. Other transcripts in the record will
be referenced by date.
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to commit a serious felony on L.N., one count of battery with intent to commit a
serious felony on S.P., and one count of sexual penetration of S.P. with a foreign
object. (R., vol. I, pp. 62-65.) The matter proceeded to trial (R., vol. I, pp. 22834, 239-50; R., vol. II, pp. 251-68), at the conclusion of which the jury found
Ramsey guilty of one count of battery with intent to commit the rape of S.P.,
sexual penetration of S.P. with a foreign object, and misdemeanor battery of L.N.
(R., vol. II, pp. 268, 271-73). The jury acquitted Ramsey of the greater offenses

of battery with intent to commit rape and attempted rape of L.N. and reached no
verdict as to the charge of attempted rape of S.P. (R., vol. II, pp. 271-73.) The
district court imposed concurrent sentences of 180 days jail for the misdemeanor
battery, 15 years with five years determinate on the battery with intent to commit
rape, and 15 years with seven years fixed for sexual penetration with a foreign
object. (R., pp. 372-75.) Ramsey timely appealed. (R., pp. 391-98.)

2

JSSUES

Because Ramsey's
questions, it is not repeated

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.)

The state

submits that the issues are:
1.

During the trial the jury inquired what would happen if it could not reach a
unanimous verdict. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberations
under the instructions already given.
Has Ramsey failed to show
fundamental error in the district court's instruction that the jury continue
deliberations?

2.

The district court denied Ramsey's motion to sever the counts related to
victim L.N. from the counts related to victim S.P. because the crimes were
connected and part of a common scheme or plan. Has Ramsey shown no
error in the district court's order denying his motion to sever?

3.

Is Ramsey's claim of excessive bail not reviewable on appeal because it
did not affect the fairness of the trial?

4.

For the first time on appeal Ramsey alleges that the 15 day delay between
the initial denial of his motion for an investigator at state expense and the
granting of that motion on reconsideration deprived him of a fair trial. Has
Ramsey failed to show error in the timing of the district court's order
granting state funds to hire an investigator?

5.

Is Ramsey's claim of error in denial of his motion for funds to hire a
psychiatrist waived because it is unsupported by any legal authority?

6.

Ramsey moved to present testimony from one witness that on one
occasion victim S.P. initiated a sexual encounter with him by dropping her
pants and telling him to "come on." Has Ramsey shown no error in the
district court's exclusion of this purported evidence related to S.P's sexual
history?

7.

Has Ramsey failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded
it lacked authority to order P. to allow the defense access to her home?

8.

During trial the district court sustained objections to questions to Ramsey
regarding whether S.P. had inquired about dating him. Has Ramsey has
failed to show error in the district court's rulings?

9.

Has Ramsey failed to show fundamental error in the jury selection
process?
3

10.

Ramsey encourages this Court to make credibility determinations contrary
to those made by the jury. Has Ramsey failed to show that the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction?

11.

Has Ramsey failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies in
his case?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Ramsey Has Shown No Fundamental Error in The District Court's Instruction
That The Jury Continue Deliberations

A

Introduction
After the commencement of deliberations the jury sent an inquiry to the

district court, as follows: "What happens if we do not have a unanimous decision
on Instruction #28?" (R., vol. II, p. 269; Trial Tr., p. 802, L 19 - p. 803, L 9.)
Instruction 28 was the elements instruction on the charge of battery with intent to
commit rape on victim S.P. (R., vol. II, p. 297.) The district court declined to infer
from the question that the jury was in fact deadlocked. (Trial Tr., p. 808, L. 1 O p. 809, L. 11.) The court answered:

"The jury is to continue its deliberations

under the direction of the instructions that have been given." (R., vol. II, p. 270.)
Although counsel for the defense expressed some concern that the jury might be
deadlocked (Trial Tr., p. 806, L. 16- p. 808, L. 1), when asked if the defense had
an objection to its proposed response counsel responded, "No" (Trial Tr., p. 809,
Ls. 20-22).
On appeal Ramsey argues that, despite the lack of objection, this Court
should review as fundamental error the question of whether the district court
erred by not inquiring of the jury whether it deadlocked and instead instructing it
to continue deliberations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-21.) Ramsey's argument is
without merit; he has failed to show error, much less fundamental error.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry.

State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho

457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection

may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

In the

absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2)
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings." l9..,, at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Ramsey's claim of fundamental error
fails on all three of the elements required by Perry.
6

First, Ramsey has failed to demonstrate that the district court's answer to
the jury's question violated his "unwaived constitutional rights." k;l He has cited
no authority for his claim that a district court has a constitutional duty to inquire
whether a jury is deadlocked, much less one that would require such an inquiry
under the circumstances of this case. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported by authority "will not be
considered" on appeal).

His claim that the court gave a "dynamite" instruction

(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16) is incorrect because the instruction did not exhort
the minority jurors to reconsider their position. State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, _
n.1, 266 P.3d 1187, 1189 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011) (a dynamite instruction "exhorts
those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their position").

Even if the

instruction could be considered a "dynamite" instruction, the claimed error is not
constitutional. k;l at_, 266 P.3d at 1189-91 (to show constitutional violation
appellant claiming fundamental error must show actual coercion of jury verdict).
Because Ramsey has failed to show any constitutional error, his claim fails under
the first prong of the fundamental error standard.
Pullin's claim also fails on the second prong of the fundamental error
standard, that the error be clear on the record and without the need for additional
information, including information as to whether the lack of objection was a
tactical decision. Here there is nothing in the record to suggest coercion of an
actually deadlocked jury.

Likewise, the defense statement that it had no

objection to the district court's answer appears to have been a tactical choice to
let the jury continue to deliberate in hopes that it would acquit.

7

Finally, Ramsey has failed to show prejudice. The instruction to the jury
was merely to continue deliberating. Ramsey's assertion that the jury may have
ended up hung is merest speculation, not demonstrated prejudice.
Ramsey has failed to show fundamental error in the district court's answer
to the jury question. His complaint that the court gave a dynamite instruction is
both wrong and not a claim of constitutional error and therefore fails the first
prong of the fundamental error test.

In addition, the record in no way clearly

shows a deadlocked jury or that the defense did not make the tactical decision to
allow deliberations to continue in hopes of a hung jury or acquittal.

Finally,

because the record does not show that the district court's answer to the jury
changed the eventual verdict Ramsey has shown no prejudice.

11.
Ramsey Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Order Denying His Motion
To Sever
A

Introduction
Ramsey moved to sever charges related to victim LN. from charges

related to victim S.P. (R., vol. I, pp. 81-82; Trial Tr., p. 13, L 14 - p. 18, L 15.)
The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that the crimes were
interrelated and part of a common scheme or plan. (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 13 - p. 29,
L. 22.) The factors cited by the prosecutor included that the assaults happened

on the same night, in the same residence, at the same party, and to similar
victims in a relatively short sequence, and that the evidence for both was largely
the same because Ramsey was questioned about both assaults in the same
interview and some of the same witnesses would be called as to the assaults
8

against both victims. (Trial Tr., p. 27, L. 2 - p. 28, L. 25.) The court denied the
motion to sever, concluding the charged offenses were "sufficiently connected
together by time, location, and event" and that Ramsey would not "suffer
prejudice if the counts are not severed." (R., vol. !, pp. 102-04.)
On appeal Ramsey argues the district court abused its discretion.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-27.) Application of the relevant law to the facts of this
case shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether counts are properly joined is a question of law given free review.

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007). A motion to sever
properly joined counts because of prejudice, however, is directed to the trial
court's discretion.

kt at 564-65,

165 P.3d at 278-79; State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho

903, 907, 55 P.3d 896, 900 (Ct. App. 2002).

C.

Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That
The Counts Were Connected And Part Of A Common Scheme Or Plan
Counts are properly joined in a single charging document if they are either

"based on the same act or transaction" or, if based on different acts or
transactions, those acts or transactions are "connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. B(a). "Two crimes are 'connected'
together if the proof of one crime constitutes a substantial portion of the proof of
the other."
1984).

United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 776 (11 th Cir.,

"In determining whether the connection between the acts charged is

sufficient to meet the requirements of joinder under Rule 8(a), the court should
9

be guided by the extent of evidentiary overlap." United States v. Berardi, 675
F.2d 894, 899-900 (ih Cir., 1982).

"Cases discussing common plans have

focused on whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the
offenses have sufficient common elements including the type of sexual abuse,
the circumstances under which the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims."
Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279.

"Whether joinder is proper is

determined by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows." Field, 144
Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279.
The purpose of joinder is to promote judicial efficiency and "conserve state
funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid
delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial." United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134
(1968)). For these reasons, federal courts and other state courts broadly
construe their nearly identical rules in favor of joinder. United States v. Rock,
282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting federal rule 8(a) is broadly construed in
favor of joinder); State v. Reeder, 182 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that "liberal joinder" is favored in the interest of judicial economy).
The district court's determination that the charges were connected
together and part of a common scheme or plan is correct.

The district court

concluded that, as pied, "all five of the alleged offenses occurred on the same
night, at the same house, and at the same party." (R., vol. I, p. 103.) They are
connected "by time, location and event." (Id.) The charges are essentially the
same crimes committed against sequential victims in the same course of events.

10

When Ramsey failed to obtain what he wanted from the first victim he assaulted
the second. Ramsey has failed to show that the district court erred by concluding
the counts were properly joined.
Even where charges are properly joined, however, a motion to sever may
still be granted if the party making the motion demonstrates prejudice from trying
the charged counts together.

I.C.R. 14. "When reviewing an order denying a

motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant has presented
facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint trial, which denied
the defendant a fair trial." State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896,
901 (Ct. App. 2002).

The potential sources of unfair prejudice from denial of

severance are that the jury may have confused and cumulated evidence; the
potential the defense was confounded in presenting a defense; and the
possibility the jury convicted based on bad character instead of the evidence
presented.

!9.:

A defendant moving to sever has the burden of showing the

district court that joinder is prejudicial. State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537,
817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991 ). Even where joinder is ultimately deemed improper,
harmless error analysis applies. State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 362, 63 P.3d
485, 488 (Ct. App. 2003).
Ramsey has also shown no prejudice from the proper joinder. The district
court concluded that there would be no confusion of evidence or issues, no
defenses would be compromised, and appropriate jury instructions would
minimize any potential prejudice. (R., vol. I, p. 104.) Ramsey simply disagrees

11

with the court's decision.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.)

Ramsey has failed to

show actual prejudice, and therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion.

Ill.
Ramsey's Claim Of Excessive Bail Is Not Reviewable On Appeal Because It Did
Not Affect The Fairness Of The Trial
A.

Introduction
After filing the complaint, the state requested that bail be set in the amount

of $250,000. (R., vol. I, p. 37.) The magistrate granted the state's request. (R.,
vol. I, p. 38.) After Ramsey retained private counsel he filed a motion for release
on his own recognizance or, in the alternative, to reduce the bail amount to
$10,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 49-50.) Specifically, Ramsey asserted that he had an
opportunity for a temporary job, family in the area, no adult record, and desired to
join the military if he was exonerated of the charges. (Id.) The magistrate court
denied the motion. (R., vol. I, p. 51.)
After being bound over to the district court Ramsey renewed his motion for
release or reduction of bail. (R., vol. I, pp. 60-61.) The district court granted the
motion in part, reducing the bail to $100,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 70-71, 107-08.)
Ramsey renewed his motion for release on his own recognizance or
reduction of bail to $10,000. (R., vol. I, pp. 112-22.) The district court denied the
renewed motion. (R., vol. I, pp. 130-32.)
On appeal Ramsey renews his claim that he should have been granted
release or a reduced bail amount. (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29.) He asserts, for
the first time on appeal, that had he been released he "possibly" would have
found two witnesses he believes might have been helpful to the defense.
12

(Appellant's brief, p. 29.) Ramsey's claim of error is not reviewable on appeal
because he has failed to show that his bail affected the fairness of his trial.

B.

Ramsey Has Failed To Present A Claim That May Be Reviewed On
Appeal
"After trial and conviction, questions regarding excessiveness of bail

generally cannot be raised." Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860,
862 (Ct. App. 1985).

The question of whether "excessive bail materially

interfered with [the defendant's] right to counsel and impeded his defense" may
be raised after the trial, including on appeal, however.

kl

In Bitter v. United

States, 389 U.S. 15, 17 (1967), a judge's order, entered after the start of trial,
revoking bail and placing the defendant in jail 40 miles away from the courtroom
because of a "brief incident of tardiness" was held to have been merely punitive
and, therefore, imposed an unwarranted burden on defendant and his counsel.
In this case Ramsey never claimed or demonstrated to the district court
that he in fact was unable to locate defense witnesses due to his inability to meet
bail. The record contains no evidence that this allegation is factually accurate,
and the state has had no opportunity to address this claim through presentation
of evidence. The only citation to the record provided by Ramsey on appeal is
"Tr. Vol. Ill, p. L." (Appellant's brief, p. 29 (verbatim).)

Because Ramsey has

utterly failed to show any trial prejudice from the district court's setting of the bail
amount, he has failed to show reviewable, much less reversible, error.

13

IV.

Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The Timing Of The District Court's Order
Granting State Funds To Hire An Investigator
Ramsey moved for an investigator at state expense.

(R., vol. I, p. 83.)

The district court denied the motion on October 14, 2009, because Ramsey failed
to make "a threshold showing that there is a significant factor at trial that requires
the assistance of an investigator to develop."

(R., pp. 100-01.)

Ramsey

requested reconsideration and on October 29, 2009, the district court granted an
investigator "to locate any potential witnesses who may assist in [Ramsey's]
defense." (R., pp. 130, 132-33.)
For the first time on appeal Ramsey asserts that the 15 day delay between
the initial denial of his motion and the granting of the motion on reconsideration
prevented him from having a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-32.) Because
Ramsey did not raise this claim below he must demonstrate fundamental error.
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). He
has failed to even claim, much less demonstrate, fyndamental error.
In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy
that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,
976 (2010).

Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant

demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record,
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to
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whether the failure to object was a tactical
demonstrate that the error affected

, and (3) the "defendant must

defendant's substantial rights," generally

by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial court proceedings."

lil

at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Ramsey's claim of

fundamental error fails on all three of the elements required by Perry.
First, Ramsey has failed to articulate what constitutional right the district
court violated by the 15 day delay between denying and then granting the motion
on reconsideration. Second, the record is far from clear that the 15 day delay
had anytt-1ing to do with a fair trial. Ramsey's claim of trial prejudice is the barest
of unsupported speculation.

Finally, Ramsey has failed to show prejudice

because there is nothing in the record before this Court to suggest that an
investigator would have found additional witnesses in the 15 day period at issue
or that those witnesses would have ultimately helped the defense at all. Ramsey

has failed to carry his burden of showing fundamental error.

V.
Ramsey's Claim Of Error In Denial Of His Motion For Funds To Hire A
Psychiatrist Is Not Presented For Appellate Review

In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.
Earlier
formulations of this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was
not supported with argument and authority. A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not
just if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error
with argument but no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue
on appeal.
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(Citations omitted.) Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that an appellant's
brief "contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented on appeal [andJ the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." Because Ramsey's
appellate claim that the district court erred by not granting his motion for state
funds to hire a psychiatrist (Appellant['s brief, pp. 32-33) is lacking in citation to
the record, citation to any relevant legal authority, and any cogent argument, it is
not presented for appellate review.

VI.
Ramsey Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Exclusion Of Evidence
Related To The Victims' Sexual History
A.

Introduction
Prior to trial the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of the victims'

past sexual behavior.

(R., vol. I, p. 157.) The motion was brought after the

prosecution learned that the defense investigator was investigating "the intimate
details of the victims' possible past sexual behavior." (Id.; Trial Tr., p. 51, Ls. 323.) The bases of the motion were that the evidence was inadmissible and the
defense had not complied with its obligations to provide advance notice of intent
to use such evidence. (R., vol. I, p. 157; Trial Tr., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 52, L. 25.)
Ramsey's counsel stated that he had no intention of trying to introduce evidence
of the victims' sexual history and "confess[edJ the motion." (Trial Tr., p. 53, Ls. 320.)

The district court granted the motion, stating that it would "assiduously

apply" the rape shield laws at trial. (Trial Tr., p. 53, L. 21 - p. 54, L. 4.)
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The next day Ramsey's counsel

an "Offer

P:-oof" and a "Notice of

Intent to Offer Evidence of Habit" stating that the defense wanted to "offer
evidence of a habit or routine practice of [S.P.] to drop her pants when she
desires to have sex with an individual she wants to have sex with." (R., vol. I, pp.
161, 163 (capitalization altered, redundancy verbatim).)

The district court

concluded the evidence was inadmissible because it did not meet the
requirements of the rape shield laws and was not timely disclosed. (12/24/09 Tr.,
p. 25, L. 13 - p. 27, L. 18.)
During the trial the district court also held that references Ramsey made to
the victim's sexual history during a police interview should, pursuant to its prior
ruling excluding evidence of the victim's sexual history, be excluded when the
state presented the recording of that interview as an exhibit (Trial Tr., p. 460, L.
10 - p. 469, L. 7.)
On appeal Ramsey contends the evidence of the victim's sexual history
11

was admissible because it shows a pattern of behavior that is clearly similar to
the defendant's account" of the incident

(Appellant's brief, p. 34 (internal

quotation and citation omitted, italics original).) He also asserts the court erred in
excluding his statements regarding the victim's sexual history during the police
interview because such statements were "exculpatory."

(Appellant's brief, pp.

37-42.) These arguments fail on the law and the facts. Counsel for Ramsey also
claims that the district court erred by excluding the evidence because it was
untimely disclosed, arguing, without citation to the record, that the late disclosure
of intent to produce testimony of the victim's sexual history should be excused
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because the evidence was discovered the day the motion was made.
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.)

This appellate claim is contrary to the record and

irreconcilable with counsel's representations to the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).
Questions of relevancy, however, are reviewed de nova. State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864
P.2d 596 (1993).

C.

Ramsey Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The
Proposed Evidence Was Not Admissible
Admission of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is controlled by

evidence Rule 412. That rule provides that "evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior" is not admissible unless the defendant (1) complies with the
procedures of the rule and (2) admission of the evidence is "constitutionally
required."

I.R.E. 412(b).

The procedural prerequisite to admissibility was

recently set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The admissibility of I.R.E. 412 evidence is determined solely from
the basis of the I.R.E. 412 hearing. See I.RE. 412(c)(2)-(3). Under
I.R.E. 412, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is generally
inadmissible. I.RE. 412(a)-(b). A defendant seeking to introduce
evidence regarding a sex-crime victim's past sexual behavior is
required to submit a written offer of proof from which the trial court
determines if that evidence falls within the limited exceptions for
admissibility. I.R.E. 412(c)(2). In other words, the trial court
determines whether it will even consider the admissibility of the
18

evidence based upon the written offer of proof. If the trial
determines that an I.RE. 412 hearing is warranted, the evidence's
admissibility is determined from the basis of that hearing alone.
I.RE. 412(c)(3).
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,216,245 P.3d 961,968 (2010). The Idaho Court
of Appeals has articulated the constitutional standard as a two-prong test of, first,
"whether the evidence proffered is relevant" and second, if so, "whether other
legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence."
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 2003)).
Thus, to show error, Ramsey must demonstrate that he presented to the district
court an offer of proof that established both that the proposed evidence was
relevant and that its relevance was not outweighed by other legitimate interests.
The entirety of Ramsey's offer of proof is as follows:
The Defendant will offer proof, through Jesse Trujillo, that
Mr. Trujillo had sexual intercourse with [S.P.]. That she was
aggressive in wanting to have intercourse with him and that at the
time of the incident she dropped her pants and invited him to "come
on."
This evidence is relevant to corroborate the habit or practice
that Defendant claims she made with him when she invited him to
have sex with her.
(R., vol. I, p. 161.) Ramsey's offer of proof utterly fails to show the relevance of

evidence that the victim had sex with Trujillo on one occasion, that she was
"aggressive in wanting to have intercourse," that she took off her pants in order to
have intercourse, and that she uttered the words "come on" on that occasion.
One incident does not establish a "habit" or "practice" as stated in the written
offer of proof. Likewise, the offer of proof does not show consent or corroborate
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Ramsey's version of events as Ramsey argued to the district court. (12/24/09
Tr., p. 22, L. 24 - p. 23, L. 18.) At best it is evidence of a prior sexual act used
merely to paint the victim as a person of questionable moral character-the very
thing prohibited by Rule 412. The district court properly held that Ramsey had
failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to admission of the evidence under the
constitutional right exception to the rule. (12/24/09 Tr., p. 25, L. 23 - p. 26, L. 4.)

D.

Ramsey Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The
Proposed Evidence Was Not Timely Disclosed
Rule 412 requires the offer of proof "no later than" five days before trial. 2

I.R.E. 412(c)(1). To be excepted from the requirement the defendant must show
that the evidence is either newly discovered or that the issue to which the
evidence pertains has newly arisen. Id. Ramsey's offer of proof was filed at 4:32
p.m. on December 23, 2009 (R., vol. I, p. 161) and the trial was scheduled to
start at 9:00 a.m. on December 28, 2009 (R., vol. I, p. 137).

Because of the

intervening holiday and weekend, the offer of proof was effectively filed less than
two days before trial. See I.R.C.P. 6(a) (when time allowed is less than seven
days, weekends and holidays are excluded).

The district court determined

Ramsey had failed to show that the evidence was newly discovered. (12/24/09
Tr., p. 27, Ls. 1-4.)
Compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 412 is a prerequisite
to admissibility.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 216, 245 P.3d at 968.

2

Because Ramsey

The district court also entered a scheduling order requiring disclosure, 30 days
before trial, of intent use evidence governed by I.R.E. 412, unless the party could
show good cause to depart from the schedule. (R., vol. I, p. 139.)
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comply with the notice requirements of I.R.E. 412(c)(1), the district court
properly concluded the evidence was inadmissible under that rule.
Ramsey argues on appeal that the evidence was newly discovered.
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.)

Specifically, counsel asserts that the "specific

information referred to in the Offer of Proof and Notice of Intent to Offer Habit or
Practice came to defense counsel's attention after the hearing on the State's
Motion in Limini [sic]" held the day before. (Appellant's brief, p. 33. 3) Counsel's
representations to this Court are irreconcilable with his representations to the
district court. At the hearing on the state's motion in limine counsel stated:
There are some aspects of their [the victim's] past conduct that may
deal with a form of habit, the habit of one of these alleged victims
that I don't intend to bring up myself, but it could develop in the
evidence. I have no intention of myself going into it. And [S.P.], I
understand, has kind of a reputation for certain types of sexual
conduct that I had considered bringing up, but I am not going to do
that.
(Trial Tr., p. 53, Ls. 9-17.) At the hearing on Ramsey's offer of proof counsel
stated:
Well, first of all when we were in court the other day I was talking
about character evidence. And I think that you will find that in my
statement I specifically said there was some evidence concerning
[the victim's] conduct that we might try to offer. This was part of
that information that I was alluding to. I did not say I would not
try to offer evidence of habit or evidence that-what I said was that
I would not-I was not going to offer any evidence of character.
(12/24/09 Tr., p. 24, L. 23 -

p. 25, L. 6 (balding added).)

3

Counsel's

In the brief counsel asserts disclosure occurred September 23, 2009
(Appellant's brief, p. 33.) The disclosure in fact happened on December 23,
2009. (R., vol. I, p. 161.) Undersigned counsel assumes this is a typographical
error.
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representations to this Court, that the evidence was discovered after the hearing
on the state's motion, cannot be squared with his representations to the district
court, that counsel knew about the evidence at the hearing on the state's motion
but had not decided to offer it at trial. Ramsey has failed to show that the district
court's determination that Ramsey had failed to prove that the evidence was
newly discovered, in order to avoid the consequences of the untimely filing, was
erroneous.

VII.
Ramsey Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To Access To The Victim's
Home
A.

Introduction
Ramsey moved for the court to compel the victim to grant the defense

access to her house.

(R., vol. I, pp. 93-94.) The only authority cited for that

motion was Idaho Criminal Rule 16(d).

(Id.)

The prosecutor argued that the

district court lacked authority to compel the victim to allow persons associated
with the defense into her house, noting that Rule 16(d) applied only to places in
the control of the prosecuting attorney. (Trial Tr., p. 24, L. 4 - p. 25, L. 16.) The
prosecutor stated that the victim was willing to allow the investigating police
officer to have access and to take photographs and measurements, and that was
likely to happen in the future. (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 17 - p. 26, L. 12.) Ramsey
argued that the rules did allow the court to order access as discovery and that
measurements of the interior and exterior of the house would be relevant to
whether the touching was consensual. (Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 11 - p. 37, L. 17.) The
district court concluded that the discovery rules did not grant it authority to order
22

a non-party to allow the defense access to her property. (R., vol. I, pp. 104-05.)
On appeal Ramsey argues that the court erred because "[i]n effect, [the victim]
was undeniably a party to the prosecution." (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-36.) This
argument fails because it is unsupported by law.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review.

State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Kavaiecz,
139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003).

C.

The District Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction To Force The Victim To
Submit To An Inspection Of Her Home By The Defense
"Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to adjudicate the claim

as to the person. That a court has 'jurisdiction of a party' means either that a
party has appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, has otherwise
waived service of process, or that process has properly issued and been served
on such party."

State v. Rodgers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1121

(2004). In a criminal case, the court properly acquires jurisdiction over a person
who appears at the initial court setting on a complaint or arraignment on the
indictment.

Rodgers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1122 (citing I.C.R. 4, 10).

See also State v. Cronin, 923 P.2d 694, 697 (Wash. 1996).
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the lack of jurisdiction over a victim
under indistinguishable facts in State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 877 P .2d 905
(1994). Babb was charged with murdering Boone in Boone's house.

kl at 936-

37, 877 P.2d at 907-08. "Following the state's investigation into Boone's death,
23

the state surrendered possession and control of Boone's residence to Boone's
father." lg,_ at 936, 877 P.2d at 907. When Babb moved for inspection of the
premises, the district court denied the request. lg,_ at 936-37, 877 P.2d at 90708. The question presented was, "Could the trial court order a party not before
the court to allow inspection of the residence?" lg,_ at 939, 877 P.2d at 910. The
Court answered that question in the negative, stating: "Since Babb sought an
order allowing inspection of Boone's residence, it was critical that Babb bring
Boone's father before the trial court, giving Boone's father notice and an
opportunity to respond before the trial court issued an order compelling action by
Boone's father." lg,_ at 940, 877 P.2d at 911.
In this case, as did Babb, Ramsey failed to establish the district court's
personal jurisdiction over the victim.

The district court properly ruled that it

lacked personal jurisdiction to order the victim to allow the defense access to her
home.
On appeal, Ramsey asserts that victims are parties in criminal cases
because they have the right to restitution, the right to be present, the right to be
heard, and the right to notice of proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36.) This
argument is specious. By granting the victim certain rights the legislature did not
make victims parties to the criminal case. Victims do not file pleadings, make
charging decisions, have control over the presentation of evidence, or have any
other control over the prosecution of the case. In addition, by definition Boone's
father was a victim in the Babb case. I.C. § 19-5306(3) (immediate families of
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homicide victims have full rights under victim's rights statute). Ramsey's attempt
to distinguish Babb is unpersuasive.
Because S.P. was never made a party and personal jurisdiction over her
was never acquired, the district court properly concluded it had no authority to
force her to submit to an inspection of her home by the defense.

In addition,

Ramsey never established reasonable grounds for the need for such an
inspection or that he was in any way prejudiced by the lack of personal
inspection. Ramsey has therefore failed to establish error by the district court.

VIII.
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Relevancy Rulings
A.

Introduction
At trial Ramsey testified that he had no sexual contact with S.P. on the

night in question.

(Trial Tr., p. 693, L. 4 - p. 695, L. 7.)

During direct

examination defense counsel asked Ramsey whether S.P. had ever "suggested
having a relationship" or asked him for a date in contacts that Ramsey testified
happened before the date in question. (Trial Tr., p. 652, Ls. 2-15; p. 652, L. 22p. 653, L. 1.)

The prosecution objected on relevance grounds, and those

objections were sustained. (Trial Tr., p. 652, Ls. 17-20; p. 653, Ls. 2-4.)
On appeal Ramsey argues that the evidence was relevant to "Ramsey's
contention that [S.P.] made the first approach," corroborates his testimony that
S.P. invited him to the porch, and impeached S.P.'s testimony that she had no
"significant acquaintance with Ramsey prior to the evening in question."
(Appellant's brief, pp. 42-43.) Ramsey's argument is without merit.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho

671, 674, 52 P.3d 315, 318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

C.

The Proposed Evidence Is Not Relevant
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence is

relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Ramsey has failed to show any relevance of
the proposed evidence.
!n this case Ramsey's defense was that sexual contact never happened.
Whether the victim had suggested the potential for a dating relationship in no
way bolstered his claim that no sexual contact happened. The evidence was
therefore not relevant to his defense.
Ramsey claims the evidence was relevant to who "made the first
approach." (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) He does not explain why who made the
"first approach" is relevant.

Ramsey's defense was that no sexual contact

occurred, not that there was consensual sexual contact.

Ramsey's potential

testimony that S.P. sought a dating relationship with him before the day in
question is not relevant to whether sexual contact happened or even whether
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contact that did happen was consensual. 4
any

to show

of this evidence.
Ramsey next argues that it "corroborate[s]" his claim that he met S.P on

the back porch by invitation. (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) Whether he met S.P. on
the porch by invitation is not relevant to whether he subsequently dragged her
from the porch and tried to rape her. Ramsey has again failed to establish any
relevance of this evidence.
Finally, Ramsey argues that the evidence was relevant to impeach S.P.'s
testimony, citing page 118 of the trial transcript. (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) In that
page of transcript S.P. testified that she met Ramsey at some point before the
date in question through a friend who was also friends with an acquaintance of
Ramsey's. (Trial Tr., p. 118, Ls. 6-24.) Ramsey's claim that the testimony at
issue would have rebutted this evidence is frivolous.

4

Even if the evidence could be considered relevant its exclusion was harmless.
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). See also
I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded."). '"Where error concerns evidence
omitted at trial, the test is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of
excluded evidence might have contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris,
132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119
Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)). In this case Ramsey and
S.P.'s testimony about the events in question is irreconcilable, and therefore this
case turned primarily on which witness the jury found credible. There is no
reason to believe that had Ramsey been allowed to testify that S.P. had
previously inquired about dating the jury's credibility calculus would have been
different
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Ramsey has failed to show that the district court erred. His own testimony
that the S.P expressed interest in a dating relationship was not relevant to the
defense that there was no sexual contact on the night in question.

IX.
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Jury Selection

The jury panel was selected and sworn without objection. (12/28/09 Tr., p.
4, L. 24 - p. 5, L. 2 (reserved defense motion); p. 83, Ls. 7-23 (objection waived);
p. 82, L. 4 - p. 85, L. 14 Oury seated and sworn).) After the jury was sworn,
defense counsel stated that the "method by which the jury was selected was
strange" and asked what rule the trial court relied on "in not calling the 12 initial
jurors." (12/28/09 Tr., p. 88, L. 24 - p. 89, L. 6.) The trial court explained that
100 potential jurors were selected from the grand venire and randomly seated for
the panel for the case.

(12/28/09 Tr., p. 89, Ls. 7-20.)

On appeal Ramsey

contends that the jury selection process did not follow applicable rules, though
what rules were not followed and why Ramsey believes they were not followed is
unclear. (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-48.) Because no timely objection was raised
to the trial court, Ramsey has the burden of proving fundamental error on appeal.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (to show
fundamental error appellate must show constitutional error, clear error, and
prejudice); State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 678, 904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App.
1995) (if "a challenge to a jury panel or an individual juror" is not raised "before
the jury is empaneled [sic]," the appellant must show fundamental error).
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The

allow for a struck jury system, where the jury would be the

twelve jurors (plus alternates) on the potential jury panel, but when one of
potential jurors is struck for cause or by peremptory challenge, the next lowest
number potential juror moves up until twelve jurors plus alternates have been
passed for cause and peremptorily. I.R.

24(e). The struck jury system was

followed in this case. (12/28/09 Tr., p. 10, L. 10

p. 12, L. 3; p. 89, Ls. 7-20.)

The record shows that the district court followed applicable rules. Even if
the rules had not been followed, there is no constitutional violation, no clear error
on the record, and no prejudice to Ramsey from the method of jury selection
employed.

Ramsey has shown no error, much less fundamental error, in the

selection of the jury that heard the case.

X.
Ramsey Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Against Him Was Insufficient
To Support His Convictions
At trial S.P. testified that Ramsey pulled her from a back porch to the side
of the house where he pressed her against the wall of the house, told her she
wanted to do this when she told him she did not, overcame her physical
resistance and pulled down her pants, grabbed her by the throat and told her he
would kill her, pinned her to the ground, inserted a finger in her vagina, and tried
to force his erect penis into her vagina until she screamed for help. (12/28/09
Tr., p. 148, L. 18 - p. 153, L. 23.) Claiming that "[i]n the final anaiysis, this case
became a case where the jury was required to decide which of the two parties
they were to believe," Ramsey argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his
guilt

,.,._.,,"' . . . the state's evidence was "unreliable." (Appellant's brief, pp.
29

56.)

Ramsey's argument is directly contrary to well-established law that the

Court will not substitute its own credibility determinations for those of the finder of
fact.

State v. Adamcik,

P.3d _ , 2012 WL 206006, *9

Idaho

(2012) (citing State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007));
State v. Vargas,_ Idaho_,

P.3d

2012 WL 171857, *3 (Ct. App.

2012) (citing State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App.
1991 )). This Court must decline Ramsey's invitation to make its own credibility
determinations.

XI.
Ramsey Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition,
cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found
fundamental. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).
Ramsey has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, the
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, ~ . LaBelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm

judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2012.
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